In conversation with Capt. Pavlos Filippakis
We put two questions to Capt. Filippakis on sea-trial discipline: what a competent captain is doing during the trial that a buyer would not see, and the failure modes he has personally found during sea trial that a survey did not catch. Answers are given on the record, lightly edited for length and clarity.
What does a competent captain do during a sea trial that a buyer would not see? What is the captain testing for that the surveyor is not?
The surveyor tests whether the boat matches the specification. The captain tests whether she handles the way she’ll need to handle at three in the morning, in weather, with a tired crew.
I want to feel how she tracks at different speeds and sea states — does she hold a heading or fight the autopilot? Rapid load changes on the engines, not steady runs at trial RPM. Full astern from cruise. Hard-over to hard-over on the steering at load.
Stabiliser response in real sea, not in port test mode. Bridge ergonomics — can a single OOW reach every alarm and override without leaving the console? What about vibration outside of critical RPM?
Does the boat actually have an operational system in place, or is it just lying abandoned awaiting sale with the minimum amount of maintenance? You shouldn’t start from zero when you purchase an older hull, unless that is priced in.
The surveyor closes out a checklist. The captain is building a mental model of the boat he’s about to be responsible for.
Common failure modes you have personally found during sea trial that the survey did not catch?
A few that recur:
Swell from the bow up to 30 degrees each side would create a very uncomfortable motion due to the uncommon hull shape.
Lack of soft starters that created a very distinct dimming effect to internal lighting whenever there was a heavy consumer coming online.
Only a single sea chest supplying cooling water to the main engine. Essentially zero redundancy.
Hydraulic stabilisers operating with incorrect nitrogen charge in the hydraulic accumulators — generates severe hydraulic noise in zero-speed mode that renders the system unusable with guests onboard. Passes every static pressure check. You only find it when you actually anchor somewhere and run it.
Bow thruster thermal cut-outs set for cold trial water — fine in northern Europe, nuisance trips in August Mediterranean. To reset the trip a person had to travel to the forecastle.
Excessive soot when starting generators required a person to climb on the mast and physically cap the exhausts.
Main engine would require a two-hour starting process to bring the lube oil to temperature from cold condition.
Fire pump had a common DC motor with the lube oil pump and would increase the main engine oil pressure whenever it was put in operation. Fire pump was also providing cooling water to one of the thrusters.
Both generators together couldn’t supply full hotel load with both thrusters running simultaneously.
Autopilot directly connected to the steering system, without a separate FU or NFU system. If the single autopilot unit failed (e.g. a blown fuse) you had to revert to emergency steering.
Emergency generators not starting automatically — permitted under grandfather rules, but operationally unacceptable.
Negligible rudder effect when going astern unless at speeds over 2.5 knots.
Lack of a stern-to gangway, essentially forcing the vessel to berth only alongside — fewer options at higher cost.
Tender retrieval that required five to six hands on deck on a slight beam swell.
Multiple other items that could bar the vessel from attaining commercial registration in the future.